Opinion: Opinion | How Taliban Has Now Become A Pawn In India-Pak Power Play

Opinion: Opinion | How Taliban Has Now Become A Pawn In India-Pak Power Play

Afghanistan, long a theatre of regional contestation, continues to serve as a strategic chessboard for India and Pakistan - two historic rivals with deeply intertwined security, strategic, and economic interests in the region. This geopolitical manoeuvring was exemplified in India's abstention at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on a resolution calling for political inclusion and the reversal of the Taliban's repressive policies. Justifying its stance, India's Permanent Representative to the UN, Parvathaneni Harish, argued that a “business as usual” approach without targeted new initiatives would do little to mitigate terrorism in the region.

Meanwhile, Pakistan's continued senior-level diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, even as it accuses the administration of harbouring anti-Pakistan militant outfits in Afghanistan, underlines the duplicity of its approach.

For both India and Pakistan, Afghanistan serves not just as a site for the externalisation of their broader conflict, but also as a crucial gateway to Central Asia, critical to their economic and trade ambitions. Access to energy corridors and untapped mineral resources, including rare earth elements, elevates Afghanistan's geostrategic value. At a January meeting this year between India's foreign secretary and the Taliban foreign minister, both sides agreed to promote the use of Iran's Chabahar Port to facilitate regional trade and commercial activities. Similarly, regional energy initiatives, such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, hinge on political stability and secure transit through Afghan territory.

Water resources also factor in these regional stakes. Upstream river systems originate in Afghanistan and flow into Pakistan, making them a vital source. New Delhi, aware of this dynamic, also sees potential leverage in the evolving regional water politics.

Moreover, the dominant Pashtun community in Afghanistan remains central to both countries' strategic calculus, despite their differing motivations and methods. The Pashtun population, concentrated on both sides of the contested Durand Line and including a small minority in India, has historically influenced New Delhi and Islamabad's policies toward Kabul, adding a complex layer of ethno-political considerations to the equation.

India's cautious approach is rooted in its experience with Pakistan-backed militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was formed in Afghanistan's Kunar province, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), whose earlier iterations reportedly trained Kashmiri militants in camps such as Khalid bin Walid during the Taliban administration of the 1990s. India's current strategy is focused on providing humanitarian aid and engaging diplomatically with the Taliban to maintain goodwill, while simultaneously pressing for security assurances to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a launchpad for anti-India militant outfits. New Delhi remains wary of an Afghanistan under significant Pakistani influence.

Both JeM and LeT have pledged allegiance to the Taliban and provided fighters to the outfit in the late 1990s, asserting their position as valuable allies. In return, the Taliban allowed these groups to operate camps, recruit fighters, and plot cross-border attacks. While the recent status remains obscure, a 2022 UN report suggests that LeT and JeM have maintained training camps in Afghanistan following the Taliban's 2021 takeover of Kabul. According to the report, JeM maintained eight training camps in Nangarhar province, three of which were directly under Taliban control, while LeT operated three camps in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. Azhar also reportedly travelled to Afghanistan post-2021 to meet with senior Taliban leaders, seeking operational space and continued support for the outfit.

Islamabad has long outsourced militant activities to proxies operating from Afghan territory, while allowing the above-ground presence of organisations like JeM and LeT within Pakistan. These groups are known to operate seminaries, fundraising fronts, and charitable organisations under the guise of political and social work, thereby gaining a degree of legitimacy. A recent statement during an interview by Bilawal Bhutto, member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, suggesting that JeM chief Masood Azhar might be in Afghanistan and that Pakistan can't possibly take actions that are out of the purview of even NATO forces, suggests potential efforts to deflect responsibility and maintain plausible deniability. This strategy enables Pakistan to insulate itself from international scrutiny while continuing to indirectly support militant networks.

Alongside its pragmatic engagement with the Taliban administration, it is essential for New Delhi to sustain international pressure through global fora such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and with the support of allied partners.

(Aishwaria Sonavane is a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author