- Gulf countries faced thousands of Iranian missile and drone attacks.
- GCC nations want Iran’s threat capability degraded post-war.
Edited by: Wesley Rahn
Since the beginning of the Iran war, Gulf countries have absorbed thousands of Iranian missile and drones, with Tehran taking aim at targets including US military bases and civilian energy infrastructure.
On Monday, Kuwait said its air defenses were fending off a missile and drone barrage after the US said it had targeted radar and drone sites in southern Iran.
Due to their close physical proximity to Iran and alignment with Washington, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are especially vulnerable when tension escalates.
In the likely case that the war comes to a negotiated end with the Islamic Republic regime still running Iran, the long-term question for the region will be how GCC countries and Tehran can move forward.
Gulf Arab states have expressed to Washington that just ending the war is not enough and have insisted that Iran’s ability to threaten the region with missiles and drones must be degraded.
“If Iran and the United States reach an agreement, and Iran leaves its state of hostility with the West, it would have to take important diplomatic and economic steps to improve its regional conditions and its relations with its neighbors,” said Babak Dorbeiki, a London-based political analyst and former official at Iran’s Strategic Research Center.
Dorbeiki told DW that from Tehran’s perspective, the GCC countries it has targeted in the current war are not “neutral actors,” but have played some role in pressure campaigns against Iran, whether by hosting US forces, providing logistical help or supporting military action indirectly.
In the short term, Dorbeiki said Iran’s neighbors were likely to look at Tehran with deeper suspicion and greater caution. That would affect not only diplomacy, but also trade routes, regional infrastructure and future transport and energy corridors.
Gulf States Want Regional Stability
In late April, leaders of GCC countries convened for the first time in Saudi Arabia to coordinate a response to Iranian strikes. Between the beginning of the war on February 28 and when a ceasefire was announced on April 8, Iran has launched more than 4,000 missiles and drones at targets in the GCC, most of which were intercepted.
Although the frequency of Iranian strikes has subsided, the economy and infrastructure of Gulf states are still in a vulnerable position amid regional instability. During the GCC talks in April, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry warned against the possibility of a “frozen conflict” that could heat up “every time there is a political reason.”
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) said Iran had to stop attacking neighboring states if diplomacy was to move forward, while Saudi Arabia warned Tehran not to target the kingdom or other Gulf countries.
During the conflict with the US and Israel, Tehran has alienated some countries that lent a helping hand in the past.
The UAE, along with non-GCC countries Iraq and Turkey, played an important role in trade, finance and re-export channels that gave Iran breathing room amid international sanctions.
Rivalry existed, especially in oil and gas markets, but a working balance had still emerged. If Gulf states increasingly coordinate around shared mistrust of Tehran, the consequences could extend beyond politics and into trade, logistics and long-term regional development.
Necessity Of Geography
Reza Alijani, a Paris-based political analyst, told DW that the physical proximity of Iran and its Gulf neighbors would force some degree of accommodation.
“Geography will always remain more powerful than politics. These countries will always be neighbours,” he said.
Alijani added, however, there is a clear distinction between rebuilding relations and rebuilding trust, with the most likely outcome not being genuine reconciliation but a tactical reduction in open hostility.
Shared interests, especially in energy exports, trade and regional stability, may eventually push both sides toward a limited modus vivendi, he said.
But that would not necessarily mean the end of enmity. It might simply mean a colder, more carefully managed rivalry.
Iran’s Power Projection In Middle East
The Islamic Republic has built much of its regional influence on missiles, drones and proxy militias. That model was designed to deter stronger adversaries and expand Iran’s leverage without direct conventional confrontation.
After the current war, and the overall degradation of Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah and Shiite militias in Iraq, Arab states are likely to place greater emphasis on integrated defense, economic coordination and alternative energy and trade corridors that reduce exposure to Iranian pressure.
Dorbeiki said that mutual suspicion towards Tehran could itself become a driver of closer commercial cooperation among Arab states and their partners, which could leave Iran more isolated from emerging trade corridors, transport links and future energy infrastructure.
However, no regional order could fully stabilize while Iran remained permanently outside it.
A genuine normalization in ties would demand a serious change in Tehran’s regional policy, a less confrontational relationship with the West and a sustained effort to reassure neighbors that Iran is prepared to pursue stability rather than leverage through fear. Right now, hostilities are still ongoing, and the Iranian regime remains in power with the same policies.
Disclaimer: This report first appeared on Deutsche Welle, and has been republished on ABP Live as part of a special arrangement. Apart from the headline, no changes have been made in the report by ABP Live.
