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At the UNGA, Donald Trump accused NATO countries of ‘funding the war against themselves’ by buying Russian gas. Here’s a look at how much Europe still pays Moscow for it
US President Donald Trump delivers remarks to the United Nations General Assembly at the UN headquarters. (AFP photo)
At the United Nations General Assembly in New York, US President Donald Trump on Tuesday put NATO’s energy ties with Moscow under the scanner. He accused European allies of “funding the war against themselves” by continuing to buy Russian gas despite sanctions. “Who the hell ever heard of that one?” he mocked, arguing that paying Moscow for energy undermines collective security.
While he bracketed India and China as large crude buyers, his sharpest criticism was directed at NATO countries, especially France, which is bound by long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts running into the 2030s. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen endorsed Trump’s line, saying, “Trump is absolutely right. We are working on it.”
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How Much Russian Gas Does Europe Still Import?
According to European Commission data compiled from ENTSOG and LSEG, Russia sent more than 150 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas to the EU in 2021, over 40 per cent of imports. By 2024, that figure had dropped to under 52 bcm: 31.6 bcm by pipeline and around 20 bcm as LNG. Russia’s share of EU imports is now below 19 per cent, a dramatic shift but still significant for a bloc that has spent years pledging to “end dependence.”
The gap was filled largely by Norway, which delivered 91 bcm in 2024, a third of EU imports, while the United States more than doubled its LNG supplies to 45 bcm, and Algeria raised its exports to 39 bcm. Yet Russia still ranked as the EU’s fourth-largest supplier. For Brussels, that is an uncomfortable reality: even after cutting demand by nearly a fifth since 2021, gas still heats three in ten European households, powers industries from steel to fertilisers, and stabilises electricity grids.
In other words, Europe’s success in reducing Russian flows has been real but incomplete.
Which NATO Countries Still Buy The Most Russian Gas?
Independent trackers suggest that Europe’s “pivot away” from Moscow is less complete than its leaders like to stress. According to Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA’s) August 2025 report, the EU still absorbed half of Russia’s LNG exports and 35 per cent of its pipeline gas.
Outside NATO, the other major buyers were China (21 per cent of Russia’s LNG, 30 per cent of pipeline flows) and Japan (18 per cent of LNG).
Within Europe, the bulk of the business is concentrated in a handful of NATO states. Hungary led the list, spending €416 million that month, including €240 million for pipeline deliveries, a reminder that Budapest has consistently resisted calls for a total embargo. Slovakia followed with €276 million in payments, €72 million of which was for pipeline flows.
Among Western European powers, France imported €157 million worth of LNG despite having been one of the bloc’s loudest voices on sanctions. The Netherlands and Belgium, both major LNG hubs for Europe, added €65 million and €64 million respectively.
Together, these five countries alone transferred €979 million to Moscow in a single month, with over 60 per cent of that tied directly to gas. On a daily basis, CREA estimated that Russia earned €31 million from LNG and €75 million from pipeline gas sales to the EU in August 2025.
What makes the numbers striking is not just their scale but who is doing the buying. The top five include Hungary and Slovakia, often cited as sanction sceptics, but also France, the Netherlands and Belgium, countries that have publicly pushed for tougher restrictions while still importing Russian LNG.
Brussels counts import volumes, but independent trackers like CREA follow Russia’s revenues. Both sets of data show the same story from different angles: dependence is down, but money still flows.
Where Does India Stand?
At the UNGA, Trump bracketed India with Russia’s biggest energy customers, accusing New Delhi of “funding the war” through its purchases. But on gas, the charge does not hold up.
According to the US Energy Information Administration’s February 2025 brief, India’s LNG imports in 2023 came overwhelmingly from Qatar and other Middle Eastern suppliers, with the US also sending significant volumes. Russia did not feature on the supplier list.
Independent trackers back that up. CREA estimated that in August this year, India imported about €3.6 billion worth of Russian fossil fuels. But the breakdown was clear: 78 per cent was crude oil, 14 per cent coal, and 8 per cent oil products.
This is not a new pattern. India has built long-term LNG ties with Qatar and the Middle East for both pricing stability and geography. Its diversification into Russian energy has been almost entirely into discounted crude.
Why Europe Can’t Quit Russian Gas Overnight
Europe’s continued dependence is not simply a matter of willpower. It rests on three hard realities:
- Contracts: Many EU states remain locked into long-term “take-or-pay” LNG agreements that require payment whether cargoes are used or not. France, for example, is tied into deals that stretch well into the 2030s. Breaking them would trigger legal disputes and hefty penalties.
- Infrastructure: Replacing Russian flows requires massive investment in LNG terminals, new pipelines and expanded storage. Europe has moved quickly, building new regasification facilities in Germany and elsewhere, but gaps remain, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where alternatives are scarce.
- Demand: Even with a 19 per cent fall in consumption since 2021, natural gas still heats nearly a third of EU households and underpins major industries from fertilisers to steel. Phasing it out overnight would mean economic and political upheaval.
These constraints explain why, despite political pledges and falling import shares, Europe’s gas bill for Russia still runs into the billions.
Brussels Wants A 2026 LNG Ban, But Will Hungary and Slovakia Agree?
According to Politico, a draft of the European Commission’s 19th sanctions package against Russia includes the toughest energy proposal yet: to eliminate all Russian LNG purchases by the end of 2026. That is a year earlier than the EU’s existing 2027 timeline.
The draft text spells out two deadlines. Long-term LNG contracts with Russian suppliers must expire by 2026, while short-term spot deals would have to end within six months of the package entering into force. The logic, in Brussels’ words, is to “further decrease Russia’s revenues from fossil fuels, raise the costs of its illegal actions in Ukraine and put maximum pressure on Russia to cease its war of aggression.”
But the LNG ban is only one part of the wider package. The same draft also proposes restrictions on Russia’s sanctions-busting banks and crypto channels, bans EU companies from using non-EU ports linked to weapons transfers or sanctions evasion, and limits investment in Russia’s special economic zones. In effect, the LNG clause sits inside a broader sanctions bundle, the 19th since February 2022.
The politics are the real obstacle. EU sanctions require unanimity, and Hungary and Slovakia are expected to resist. Both remain heavily reliant on Russian pipeline gas, and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has repeatedly threatened to veto sanctions he says hurt Europe more than Russia. Slovakia, too, depends on Russian flows to keep its economy running.
Bottom Line: Europe Still Foots Moscow’s Gas Bill
By the European Commission’s count, EU imports of Russian gas have fallen from over 150 bcm in 2021 to less than 52 bcm in 2024. But CREA’s August 2025 data show NATO countries still paid nearly €1 billion to Moscow in just one month, most of it gas. Europe today accounts for half of Russia’s LNG exports and more than a third of its pipeline sales.
India, despite Trump’s rhetoric, does not figure in the gas story. Its Russian energy imports are crude oil. The contradiction remains: NATO allies, not India, continue to bankroll Russia’s gas trade even as they pledge to cut ties.
About the Author
Karishma Jain, Chief Sub Editor at News18.com, writes and edits opinion pieces on a variety of subjects, including Indian politics and policy, culture and the arts, technology and social change. Follow her @kar…Read More
Karishma Jain, Chief Sub Editor at News18.com, writes and edits opinion pieces on a variety of subjects, including Indian politics and policy, culture and the arts, technology and social change. Follow her @kar… Read More
September 24, 2025, 20:06 IST
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