“If you don’t want war, then you had better be an advocate for diplomacy with muscle,” Richard Grenell, an American diplomat, had stated in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This can also be applied in the case of India and China, which are not in a state of war, but have been engaged in a bitter border dispute for over seven decades now. While the roots of the dispute date back to the colonial era, tensions significantly intensified after India gained independence in 1947 and the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949.
The primary cause is the lack of a mutually agreed-upon Line of Actual Control (LAC) across three major sectors. And at the centre of this dispute lies Tibet. While India’s stated policy of ‘One-China’ remains firm, New Delhi cannot keep brushing under the carpet the fact that the issues of the Dalai Lama, who continues to remain in India, need redressal. India’s approach to the ‘One-China’ policy concerning Tibet is rooted in a series of formal agreements that acknowledge Tibet as part of China.
However, over the past decade, this policy has evolved to become more conditional and strategic in its application. Officially, India recognises the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as part of Chinese territory, but there has been a noticeable shift; India no longer emphasises this recognition in its joint statements with China. This subtle yet significant change reflects India’s growing insistence on mutual respect for its own territorial integrity, signalling a more assertive stance on sovereignty issues. As India navigates its complex relationship with China, the implications of this policy shift highlight a careful balancing act between diplomatic engagement and the assertion of national interests.
Earlier this month, India once again categorically rejected China’s latest attempt to rename 23 locations in Arunachal Pradesh, calling the move “fictitious,” “mischievous,” and an attempt to manufacture “baseless narratives”. On April 1, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs announced it had “standardised” names for sites in what it calls “Zangnan” (Southern Tibet). These sites include mountain peaks, residential areas, and rivers. China has defended the renaming as its “sovereign right,” claiming the region is historically significant to China. Despite the renaming, Beijing stated its policy toward improving relations with India remains “unchanged”.
All these controversies stem from the fact that India continues to give refuge to the Dalai Lama, who has become a colossal religious figure not just for the Buddhist community but for people across all faiths and religions around the world. As of 2026, the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, has spent 67 years living in India following his escape from Tibet. He arrived on March 31, 1959, seeking political asylum after a failed national uprising against Chinese rule in Lhasa.
He often refers to himself as a “son of India” or the longest guest of the Indian government, highlighting his deep cultural and spiritual ties to the country. In India, he established schools, monasteries, and cultural institutions like the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives to ensure the survival of Tibetan religion and language for the approximately 80,000 refugees who followed him.
In 2011, he officially devolved his political authority to a democratically elected leader, remaining strictly as a spiritual figurehead. The political wing thereafter came under the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), headed by a President, also called ‘Sikyong’ in Tibetan language. The CTA functions as a “government-in-exile,” though it is not formally recognized by any sovereign nation.
When Dalai Lama came to India and first arrived in Tawang, Beijing knew it was Indian territory. Therefore, the fact that today Beijing is claiming Arunachal Pradesh as its own has its own political connotation and hence the need to deal with the Tibet issue by India with the Chinese in an open and direct manner.
The Tibetan community itself, be it the Office of the Dalai Lama or the CTA, has also made several pleas to the government of the day and all previous governments of India to raise the matter with the Chinese. This is now all the more necessary, not just for strategic reasons or for the settlement of the boundary question but also to address the long-pending issue of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama.
Beijing, on the other hand, has now put in place a complete process on how the next Dalai Lama will be elected when the current one passes away, and it is also willing to discuss the matter with India, but New Delhi has not relegated the issue to a religious matter. Since 2010, India has stopped using the phrase ‘One-China policy’ in joint communiqués. This change was a response to China’s practice of issuing “stapled visas” to Indian citizens from Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, which India views as a challenge to its own territorial integrity. Therefore, it is time to take that process forward and institutionalise a dialogue between both sides on how to resolve the issue of the Dalai Lama and then Tibet.
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Nayanima Basu is a senior independent journalist.
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