In Christopher Nolan’s Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb grimly predicts that once America splits the atom, others will inevitably follow. His prophecy came true. The Soviets, the British, the French, and then the Chinese, all rushed to wield the fire of creation as an instrument of war. India, decades later, joined that fateful lineage.US President Donald Trump in October said that the United States would “immediately” resume nuclear weapons testing. This prompted a sharp concern from Moscow, with senior Russian officials telling USA Today they are still awaiting a formal explanation from the White House. The officials warned that if Washington restarts nuclear testing, Russia will follow suit. Trump, who made the announcement on 29 October without specifying the nature of the tests, said the move was essential to ensure America kept pace with rival nuclear powers.The world now once again finds itself on the edge of an arms race.For India once a nuclear outsider, now a mature atomic power the question is back on the table: should it test again?
How we got here
When US President Donald Trump announced in late October that Washington was considering a restart of nuclear testing, the move was pitched as a strategic necessity to “keep pace” with Russia and China. Global backlash was immediate. The United States has maintained a moratorium on explosive testing since 1992, and even now, US officials insist that any planned tests would be “noncritical,” meaning non-explosive system checks. Experts say a full underground test would take years of preparation and political will that doesn’t currently exist. Still, the symbolism of even entertaining the idea has rippled across nuclear capitals. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) has warned that any explosive test would be “harmful for peace and security,” and Russia has made clear it would only follow if the US does first.The taboo against nuclear testing the moral backbone of non-proliferation remains intact, but cracks are visible. And India is watching closely.
Why this matters for India
India last tested nuclear weapons in 1998 under Operation Shakti and declared a unilateral moratorium on further tests. Though New Delhi never signed the CTBT, it leveraged that restraint to secure landmark deals chief among them the 2008 Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, which ended decades of technological isolation.Those gains came with implicit red lines. The US retains the right to suspend cooperation if India tests again, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver explicitly cites India’s voluntary moratorium. Legally, India is free to test. Politically and economically, the costs could be steep.Yet within India’s strategic community, the question lingers: are the 1998 thermonuclear designs fully validated? Have modern warhead miniaturisation and MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle) systems outpaced older data? The Agni-5 MIRV test earlier this year reignited those debates.
The case for testing (and its limits)
Proponents of renewed testing make three arguments.First, credibility. They argue that live detonations would validate India’s thermonuclear design margins, especially for advanced delivery systems and naval warheads that face extreme stresses.Second, deterrence signalling. A single “confidence” test framed as a reaffirmation, not escalation could reassure adversaries that India’s deterrent is reliable and modern.Third, a shifting global mood. If the US and Russia resume explosive tests, the diplomatic isolation India faced in 1998 might not repeat itself.But even advocates admit limits. Non-explosive subcritical experiments and supercomputing simulations have advanced so far that all five nuclear powers maintain stockpiles without detonations. And once a state tests, it rarely stops at one; technical curiosity breeds political momentum. Most crucially, a test today would cost India dearly in its partnerships, markets, and reputation.
The costs and risks
Civil nuclear exposure:Under the Indo-US framework, any test could lead to the suspension of civil nuclear cooperation. That means possible disruption of fuel supplies, spare parts, and future reactor deals.Strategic blowback:Pakistan would almost certainly respond if not with a test, then by fast-tracking fissile production. China, too, could use it as justification to harden its posture or expand its readiness near Tibet and Xinjiang.Diplomatic damage:India’s image as a “responsible power” has underpinned its global rise from the Quad to semiconductor partnerships. A test would puncture that narrative, inviting criticism even from friends like Japan and France.Economic fallout:Sanctions in 1998 were short-lived, but the world was simpler then. A repeat today could trigger targeted export bans, insurance restrictions, and pressure on high-tech collaborations.Opportunity costs:Every diplomatic fire India fights post-test would slow down what truly matters deploying MIRVs, perfecting submarine-launched systems, and strengthening command-and-control. Quiet modernisation, not loud demonstration, sustains deterrence.
India vs Pakistan: The balance of power
For India to justify its stance on nuclear deterrence, it need not look far only across its border. The military imbalance between India and Pakistan is striking. India’s defence budget, at around $79 billion, vastly outweighs Pakistan’s $8 billion. India also maintains 1.4 million active personnel compared with Pakistan’s 700,000, and operates roughly 730 combat aircraft against Pakistan’s 450India has also recently overtaken Pakistan in nuclear warheads, with an estimated 180 to Pakistan’s 170. The Agni-5 MIRV system gives India multiple warheads per missile, extending deterrence beyond the subcontinent. Pakistan’s Shaheen-3, by contrast, is still maturing.In a conventional conflict, India dominates. But nuclear parity real or perceived remains Pakistan’s ultimate shield. That’s why any Indian test could provoke a mirror response, risking a regional arms spiral.
A prudent path
For now, restraint serves India better. Maintaining the moratorium while investing in subcritical testing, hydrodynamic experiments, and supercomputing offers a safer route. These methods allow for simulation-based confidence-building without violating the CTBT spirit.India also retains its legal exit clause: it never signed the CTBT and can test if national security demands it. But that right should be exercised sparingly only with overwhelming justification and a clear diplomatic plan for damage control.
Strategic resilience and partnerships
India’s long-term play lies in resilience reducing dependency on any single partner. Deepening civil nuclear cooperation with France and Japan, expanding European technology ties, and investing in indigenous fuel cycles can cushion future shocks.Simultaneously, India can use international forums to advocate for transparency in subcritical testing, portraying itself as a disciplined steward of deterrence rather than a reckless actor.
Bottom line: Not yet
India’s nuclear story from Bhabha’s laboratories to Vajpayee’s Pokhran has always balanced idealism with pragmatism. The moral of that journey still stands: restraint amplifies power.Until the United States or another major power resumes explosive testing, India gains more by staying the course. Testing now would deliver marginal technical benefits but major political costs. The smarter move is quiet preparation, not public detonation modernising deterrence without breaking the world’s most fragile peace taboo.(With inputs from agencies) Go to Source
