Prashant Kishor entered the Bihar election like a master chess player stepping onto a kabaddi field: Armed with strategy, precision, data and design, but facing a game that rewards an entirely different skill set. For a decade, he had shaped the victories of others from behind the curtain, pulling strings with the confidence of a man who understood the machinery of Indian politics better than most.But 2025 was his first attempt at stepping into the arena himself, not as an architect but as a contender. And that’s where the gulf between theory and terrain snapped into focus.
Kishor believed he could build a political alternative brick by brick, through a 3,000-km padyatra, meticulously crafted policy blueprints, dashboards, survey teams, thematic campaigns and a long-term mission for “Jan Suraaj”.
Election Results 2025
Prashant Kishor’s party tried to run before it had learned to stand, and in the ‘mother of all elections’ that proved to be its undoing.
From the next Kejriwal to a dud in polls
Like Arvind Kejriwal in 2013, Kishor emerged as an outsider armed with policy plans, an anti-establishment vocabulary, and the promise of a new political grammar. Both championed clean governance, citizen-centric politics, and a break from old caste-coalition formulas. Kishor’s marathon padyatra was often compared to AAP’s mohalla meetings, a slow, deliberate attempt to build trust at the street level. Kishor’s reformist pitch only added to the narrative that he was Bihar’s potential Kejriwal: the educated disruptor poised to leapfrog traditional parties.But the comparison, in hindsight, revealed the very gap that derailed Jan Suraaj. Kejriwal built a movement that quickly became a disciplined party machinery, with volunteers who morphed into cadres. Kishor built a mission, not a machine. Where AAP’s early politics thrived on decentralised leadership, Jan Suraaj had just one face. And while Kejriwal converted anger into organised energy, Kishor converted interest into applause.
The lone face paradox
Imagine a beautifully drawn architectural blueprint, promising a magnificent building — but when construction begins, there are virtually no bricks, no workers, no scaffold. That was Jan Suraaj’s campaign in Bihar: much high-end planning, but minimal ground muscle.Prashant Kishor, once the behind-the-scenes strategist, became the public face, organiser and symbol of the movement. Yet when JSP unleashed its first list of 51 candidates on October 9, his own name was absent. Even the national president of JSP acknowledged that, in the end, “people failed to understand us, and we also failed to make them understand”. The party, in essence, lacked a second line of leadership visible to the electorate. As an article observed, Kishor “overflowed with plans, data sets, PowerPoint decks, dashboards and policy road-maps” but was still missing something basic: “a party people can lean on. A structure that outlasts the speech. A booth-level army that can turn nods into votes”.In a state like Bihar where local ties, booth-level networks and familiar faces matter deeply, the absence of an organisational backbone — trained workers, district coordinators, local stalwarts, was fatal. JSP may have mobilised large marches and released glossy manifestos, but when the voter entered the polling booth, the connection between the candidate and the community was weak. The ECI data show that the dominant ally, the Bharatiya Janata Party-Janata Dal (United) (NDA) together surged ahead in early trends, leaving little room for newcomers. Without a strong party structure, Jan Suraaj was simply overwhelmed.
Candidate profile mismatch
One of the loudest themes of the JSP campaign was “clean” credentials and educated talent. The party’s first list (51 names) included mathematicians, doctors, retired bureaucrats, engineers and social activists. The second list of 65 candidates emphasised representation of extremely backward classes and minorities. The logic: bring new faces, sidestep conventional caste-politics, present merit. But the logic mis-judged the political terrain of Bihar.Electoral sociology in Bihar continues to reward candidates with ground-connect: local ‘bahubalis’, caste influencers, booth-level operators, those who have spent years hearing grievances in the community. In contrast, JSP’s ticket-holders often lacked such roots. A Times of India report noted that many voters “didn’t recognise the name, much less the candidate’s work”. So why did this matter? Because during polling, while the campaign message may register, unless the candidate is known and trusted locally, mobilisation lags. In Mokama, for instance, the ECI early rounds show JSP candidate Priyadarshi Piyush trailing far behind both the local JD(U) and RJD candidates. The mismatch was plain: professional credentials did not translate into votes. The voters appeared to decline a novelty appeal in favour of the familiar. JSP’s choice of professionals over practitioners arguably cost them seats.
Who were JSP’s picks?
Here’s a general overview of the candidates fielded by Jan Suraaj:The first list (51 candidates) announced on October 9 included a mathematician K.C. Sinha, doctors and engineers, “former bureaucrats, retired police officers” among them.The second list (65 candidates) emphasised social representation: 31 from extremely weaker sections, 21 from OBCs and 21 Muslims.The strategy was clear: ticketed candidates with high educational and professional credentials, fewer career politicians. But this came with weak local roots.For example, JSP contested from the high-profile Raghopur (stronghold of Tejashwi Yadav) by fielding Chanchal Singh. This was brave, but unrealistic in the absence of grassroots push.In plain terms: JSP picked “imported talent” rather than home-grown operatives. In a state election where local networks reign, this mismatch counted heavily against them.
The padyatra that didn’t manifest
Jan Suraaj rode on a powerful narrative, Kishor’s intimate “padyatra” across Bihar, meeting thousands of villagers, collecting grievances and positioning the party as a new-age alternative to the old frameworks. The march (which began 2 October 2022) sought to reach “17,000 people” and served as the movement’s moral backbone.Yet, when it came to the vote, that narrative failed to convert into a meaningful support base. Voter turnout in Bihar hit a record 66.9 % in 2025 — suggesting strong mobilisation overall, but not for JSP. Early trends from the ECI showed that JSP was “nowhere to be seen” on its own.Why did this happen? Three reasons: First, the narrative remained high-level and issue-based (jobs, migration, good governance) which many rural voters found abstract. Second, the march lacked visible sustained follow-up at micro-level: local committees, recurring visits, booth-level shout-lines. Without this, the momentum of the padyatra dissipated. Third, the electorate deemed the party to lack credibility: when early counts showed the NDA comfortably above the majority mark, voters shifted decisively.In short, the well-publicised march created high expectations, but it did not build a resilient voting bloc. Instead of the “wave” the narrative promised, Jan Suraaj arrived at the election like a marathon runner with no hydration stops — running hard, but without finishing strong.
Overlapping space, underwhelming position: Where did JSP stand?
Another major reason for JSP’s failure lies in its positioning. The party tried to occupy a third-space: neither the traditional Mandal/identity politics of the Rashtriya Janata Dal/Congress bloc, nor the Hindutva-driven narrative of the BJP-led edifice. Instead, it spoke of good governance, youth employment, migration, fresh faces. But in Bihar’s political climate, that space was either already saturated or unoccupied.The NDA coalition, with the BJP and JD(U), captured over 150 seats in early trends. Meanwhile, the opposition Mahagathbandhan (RJD + Congress) retained core of identity support. For a newcomer, breaking into either bloc without a mass base is difficult. Additionally, Jan Suraaj’s message of moving beyond caste was admirable in principle, but in practice voters asked: Who is the candidate? Which community backs them? Which local workers will they deploy? JSP lacked credible answers.Furthermore, the party’s launch of candidate lists revealed a contradictory message: the first list brought in 16 % Muslims, 17 % extremely backward classes, but the publicity emphasised “merit”. This may have alienated some identity-based voters who prefer visible backing by dominant local communities. The attempt to straddle both merit and representation left JSP in a confused middle. A clear take-away: in Bihar’s competitive politics, clarity of alignment matters as much as novelty of message. JSP lost both.
Execution weakness: Great campaign, poor delivery
Lastly, the execution of campaign matters. Planning a campaign is one thing — winning a seat is another. In this regard, JSP’s tournament fell short in several areas:Late candidate announcements: While JSP publicised its lists, many seats were finalised only close to nomination deadlines, leaving little time for ground-work. Absence of candidate recognition: Many listing reports point out that voters could not name JSP candidates, unlike the famed local leaders of BJP or RJD. This is a red flag in Indian electoral systems where name-recognition is key.Weak booth-level machinery: Without a cadre of local workers trained in each polling booth, the efforts remained top-heavy. Reports of the campaign emphasise salaried professionals and central teams, not local volunteers. Inadequate vote conversion: Early trends from ECI show JSP candidates getting few votes even in constituencies they contested seriously. For example, in Mokama the JSP candidate was far behind, and in other seats JSP did not even feature as a serious challenger in early rounds.No fallback alliance: Unlike many parties that farm out risk by forming alliances — either seat-sharing or post-poll understanding — JSP went solo. In a terrain dominated by the NDA and Mahagathbandhan, this isolation amplified its weakness.In sum: JSP may have built a flashy campaign, but it lacked the nuts-and-bolts of electioneering. The party did not train local workers, did not nurture candidate-community bonds, did not build fallback strategies. As a result, the votes it might have gained through novelty evaporated.
What’s next for PK?
If JSP’s debut in Bihar was a case of promise without foundation. Kishor’s style couldn’t solve the fundamentals: local anchor points, community relationships, booth-level mobilisation, name recognition, and dense organisational networks.Here are five lessons for any future attempt at a “third force” in Bihar:1. Build cadres before campaigning: Ideation must be followed by deployment of local cadres months ahead of polling.2. Candidate roots matter: Professionals make headlines; local connect wins votes.3. Convert march into mechanism: A padyatra builds awareness, but needs follow-up teams to capture voters.4. Clarity of identity: Trying to sit between two big blocs often leads to being squeezed out entirely.5. Infrastructure trumps novelty: A new party can challenge old ones, but only with strong ground-level infrastructure and local goodwill. Go to Source